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Turkey's government has recently enacted major constitutional reforms to render Turkey a more attractive 
candidate for full European Union membership in 2004. These reforms are the sixth and seventh in a 
series of harmonization packages enacted since February 2002 to conform to the EU's Copenhagen 
Criteria for accession, and they touch upon core elements of Turkey's political architecture. These include 
human rights, political expression, and—most importantly given Turkey's post-1960 political life—the 
structure and dynamics of civil-military relations. 
The current Turkish government is run by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) . Controlling over 
two-thirds of parliament, the AKP can forgo rule through coalition and has a large enough majority to 
legislate over a Presidential veto. This kind of absolute parliamentary majority is novel in Turkish politics, 
suggesting further EU-oriented democratic liberalization will occur even more smoothly. AKP, however, is 
an Islam-affiliated successor to a much more extreme Islamist party unseated by the military in 1997 and 
outlawed in 1999 for challenging Turkey's constitutionally secular character.[1] 
While passage of the seventh harmonization package raises some observers' hopes that Turkey is 
moving towards a liberal democracy as part of an EU-driven "political avalanche,"[2] new limitations on 
the Turkish Armed Forces' (TSK) interference in civilian politics to protect secularism raise darker 
questions: Are we witnessing the beginning of the AKP's larger game of hijacking the state through 
democratic procedures to alter society away from Kemalist secularism and towards socio-political Islam? 
Will this involve a defanged military unable to prevent Turkey's turn away from the United States in favor 
of Middle Eastern and Islamic political alliances, with ramifications for America's strategic position as well 
as access to Caspian and Central Asian energy resources? 
In this nightmare scenario, the AKP government and parliamentary majority have emasculated the 
military, both by making it appear impotent during the US-Turkish negotiations prior to the Iraq war, and 
now through removing the structures and mechanisms for the TSK to dictate legally-binding desires to 
civilian governments. After this, AKP will work to take over the parliament-elected presidency by moving 
the election date earlier, prior to the next round of general elections. Turkey's government could then 
mount an assault on the judiciary, the remaining stronghold of Turkish secularism. 
Such prognostication is premature. Not only has Turkey demonstrated a capacity to legislate laws one 
way and implement them differently, but in the final analysis, the TSK still has all the tanks and the most 
fans: it has a monopoly on a loyal coercive force that it has politically deployed in the past, while the 
military remains the most respected national institution among Turkish citizens.  
Rather, examination of the reforms themselves elicits certain questions: are they indeed democratizing, 
and on the level of civil-military relations do the changes render Turkey more similar to Western Europe 
and the United States? Might alterations to civil-military dynamics contribute to a more mature, balanced 
form of Turkish civilian politics? What levers of political influence remain to the military? And, to the extent 
that these are democratizing reforms, what approaches are appropriate to a United States currently 
committed to regional democratization? 
Harmonizing Measures 
Recent changes fall into two categories: those dealing with political expression and human rights, and 
those focusing on civil-military interactions. 
Political Expression, Human Rights 
In the Penal Code, expressions of thought for the sole purpose of criticism and not defamation are no 
longer subject to prosecution. Further, blanket statements such as "facilitating the actions [of criminal 
organizations] in any way" have been removed. Likewise, in the Anti-Terrorism Act, actual "incitement to 
violence" must be the criterion enabling prosecution for "propaganda against the inseparability of the 
state." The minimum penalty for insulting "Turkishness, the Republic… ministries, the military or security 
forces" has been reduced from a year to six months.  
In the Code of Criminal Procedure, investigation of state bodies for torture and misconduct are now to be 
treated as priority matters. Hearings may be delayed for no more than thirty days, taking place during 
judicial recess if need be. In peacetime, military courts will no longer prosecute civilians inciting soldiers to 
mutiny or discouraging the public from military service. As well, for the purposes of prosecution, the term 
"child" now applies to those under the age of eighteen, as opposed to the previous fifteen. 
Amending the Acts on Association and Assembly, citizens convicted for "inciting to hatred on religious, 
racial, social, or cultural grounds" will no longer be prohibited from joining associations. The Ministry of 
Interior must hasten the process of reviewing new associations' charters, while students' rights to form 
associations have been broadened. Assemblies and demonstrations may only be banned if there is a 
"clear and present danger that a criminal offense will be committed," with the term of judicial 
postponement being likewise reduced. 
Particularly important in the context of the Kurdish issue, the Act on Foreign Languages and Dialects now 
permits existing language course facilities to offer instruction in citizens' traditional dialects. Parents may 
give their children Kurdish names, while private radio and television stations may broadcast in Kurdish.[3] 
Civil-Military Relations 
Central portions of the seventh harmonization package focus on reducing the military's autonomy as a 
"state within a state."[4] Until now, the size of Turkey's defense budget has been determined almost 
entirely by the TSK itself. Further, the TSK alone decided how to spend defense liras. With sole control 
over R/D, acquisitions, and military pay, the army reduced the civilian defense ministry to an instrument of 
uniformed commanders. Now, military expenditures will come under parliamentary scrutiny through the 
Court of Accounts, a body similar to the American Government Accounting Office (GAO). 
The most fundamental alterations limit the TSK's legally-enshrined, institutionalized ability to intervene in 
civilian politics. Here, the role of the National Security Council (MGK) is at issue. A very different body 
from the American NSC, the Turkish MGK was established after the 1960 coup to "recommend to the 
cabinet the necessary basic guidelines regarding… decisions related to national security."[5] After the 
1980 coup, the 1982 Constitution greatly expanded the powers of the MGK. The council assumed the 
lead in defining national security priorities, taken to include domestic issues such as political Islam, 
(Kurdish) separatism, and organized crime. Further, the government was to "give priority consideration to 
the decisions of the MGK concerning measures it deems necessary." The MGK's decisions became much 
more than recommendations to its civilian masters; rather, they resembled decrees civilian governments 
ignored at their peril.  
For the past twenty years, the MGK's General Secretariat has managed the Council's affairs in between 
at least monthly meetings, to be called by the President in consultation with the Chief of General Staff 
(CGS). A largely military body, its 350 permanent staff are mostly active-duty or retired military, led by a 
flag officer appointed by the CGS. Empowered to obtain any classified or unclassified materials from all 
departments of state and even private individuals, the General Secretary also set the agenda of MGK 
meetings and oversaw revision of the MGK's National Security Policy Document every five years.  
The balance of civilians and military officers on the MGK also contributed to the body's becoming a chief 
institutional means for the military to forcefully communicate its views. Though including the President, 
Prime Minister, and Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and the Interior, the TSK contingent comprised 
the CGS, General Secretary, as well as land, air, naval forces and gendarmerie commanders. The MGK 
thus was numerically stacked in favor of the military, which in any event defined Turkey's national security 
priorities, prepared the MGK agenda, and ran it in between meetings. As the best-organized, best-
informed, most powerful foreign and defense policy body, the military-dominated MGK has been referred 
to as Ankara's kingmaker. It could indeed unmake civilian governments, as it did during the "soft coup" 
that toppled the Refah Islamist party from power in 1997. 
Against this backdrop, recent measures approach a civil-military revolution. First, the MGK's structure has 
been drastically revised to alter the balance of "suits" to "uniforms," by removing the force commanders 
from the Council. Though individual commanders may be consulted by the MGK, the sole remaining 
permanent military member of the MGK is the CGS. Likewise, while the General Secretary will remain as 
an ex officio member, he is now to be appointed by the President from a list provided by the Prime 
Minister, who may propose either officers or civilians. This allows for non-military control of the General 
Secretariat, and more broadly, the MGK agenda. 
Second, MGK authority has been reduced. The General Secretary will no longer act "in the name of the 
President, Prime Minister, and the MGK," but only "in the name of the MGK." On his own, he may no 
longer require all manner of documents from public and private entities. Overall, the General Secretariat 
is now confined to a research and analytical role, having been stripped of executive prerogatives. 
More broadly, the Council itself has lost its executive powers. It will now convene only bi-monthly, and the 
Prime Minister and President will no longer share with the CGS the power of calling for (or postponing) a 
meeting. Further, just as the MGK will no longer provide one-stop shopping for setting foreign and 
defense policies, it has in effect been reconstituted as a solely consultative body, by eliminating its 
powers to monitor and enforce civilian governments' compliance with Council decisions. In short, at least 
in theoretical terms, the MGK no longer makes decisions, but only offers advice. 
 
Third, other miscellaneous changes narrow the range of military intrusion into civil affairs. The MGK will 
no longer provide views on which foreign languages will be taught in Turkey. Likewise, TSK no longer has 
a uniformed representative on the National Broadcasting Authority . Both measures diminish the military's 
role in preventing cultural expressions of Kurdish identity, while the removal of a General Staff-appointed 
member to the Commission of Higher Education (YOK) suggests the TSK will be less able to intervene on 
matters of cultural and intellectual freedom in Turkey's universities.[6]  
Implications for Turkey 
Naturally, TSK leadership has been dismayed by these developments. On the eve of the parliamentary 
vote, CGS Hilmi Ozkok wrote Prime Minister Erdogan a letter condemning the changes to the MGK. In 
recent weeks, former deputy CGS Yasar Buyukanit, newly appointed to command of the 1st Army, has 
made several public statements questioning the wisdom of the changes and warning against anyone 
playing with the TSK's role for political purposes.[7] There are also rumors of junior officer criticism of 
Ozkok as too soft on the civilians, suggesting the possibility of a 1960-style coup, when mid-level officers 
executed the TSK's first intervention into politics.[8]  
Failing severe domestic and regional destabilization in the next months, this is unlikely. Even according to 
certain officers, eliminating the TSK's legal-constitutional means of intervening in the affairs of civilian 
government must be seen as a move towards the very kind of democracy characterizing those EU 
countries the Republic wishes to join. Further, political and cultural liberalization of the public space brings 
Turkish laws more into line with those of the West, that international civilization into which Turkey has 
sought integration from the first days of the Republic in 1923. And, given the entanglement of issues such 
as civil liberties and human rights, with sensitive matters like the Kurdish issue, political expression, and 
religious activism, liberalizing reforms in the socio-political sphere are meaningless without alterations to 
civil-military relations. 
Advocates of the Turkish military's continuing role in civilian politics have referred to the TSK as "Turkey's 
main bastion for political moderation" and "steady hand" guaranteeing political stability.[9] Thus far, 
however, the military has demonstrated only immoderation on the matter of Kurds, in the past even 
vetoing relatively innocuous measures on the cultural plane. Likewise, the military has cited national 
security concerns to prevent potentially dynamic civilian government progress on the Cyprus issue . 
Furthermore, the military's ability to intervene in politics either through recommendations or force has 
acted to short-circuit regularized governmental processes.  
Put differently, the presence of an over-powering TSK has by default excused civilian politicians from 
dealing wisely with a whole range of foreign and defense policy issues and domestic matters, given the 
military's broad interpretation of "national security." If fully implemented, then, the June-August reforms 
will require civilian cabinets to actually govern responsibly, as they will no longer be able to count on the 
military safety net. After poor showings in the past, politicians will have to more fully heed their 
professional diplomats and even military advisers, as they will need to think more seriously about foreign 
policy and defense matters. Potentially, then, recent reforms may drive a greater civilian political 
professionalism and sense of national responsibility. 
A related concern among those who see destabilization rather than harmonization involves the larger 
intentions of the current government. By portraying itself as merely an Islam-affiliated democratic party—
the Turkish analogue to the German Christian Democrats—is AKP practicing a form of dissimulation? Is it 
pretending to be democratic for anti-democratic aims, in order to gradually pry Turkey away from its 
secular Kemalist foundations and steward over legal, social, and political Islamization? AKP's late June 
moves to increase state-funded Islamic prayer leader (imam) slots to 15,000 raised such fears, as did the 
government's authorization of Turkish diplomatic missions abroad to engage in Islamic cultural 
activities.[10]  
Of course, it is in the nature of the political game for parties to push agendas in and out of office. Yet, as 
against the fear of stealth Islamization, it may be noted that since AKP has chosen the route of electoral 
politics, no matter what its intentions are, it must cultivate the electorate. In the November 2002 elections, 
it only acquired 34% of the vote. The majority of voters thus did not vote for an Islam-affiliated party, just 
as many AKP voters voted against other parties rather than for the AKP. The need to retain and expand 
its constituency may act to moderate a tendency to Islamist adventures. After all, substantial numbers of 
Turks will continue to view the TSK as the final resort in safeguarding Ataturk's republic. 
This suggests another element of Turkey's future political equation. While the TSK has relinquished much 
of its structured, constitutionally-legitimized influence on civilian politics, to claim it has been struck at the 
heart is to ignore its arsenal of unofficial means of influence.[11] As highlighted during the 1997 removal 
of Refah Partisi from power, these include off-the-record interviews to nationally esteemed journalists; 
official briefings to the media groups, economic elites, the diplomatic corps, and foreign representatives; 
insistent statements from the CGS press office; repeated informal visits and telephone calls to members 
of government and civil servants, either by senior serving officers, retired generals, or civilian 
intermediaries; and even hints about restless mid-level officers anxious to intervene.[12] Notably, recent 
reforms have not at all touched upon these kinds of autonomous "public relations" tools at the military's 
disposal. Of course, the TSK has also been known to divert armored columns through towns where 
Islamist mayors have attempted to flout military preferences. 
At the same time, the ability of the Turkish military to deploy these informal means of influencing civilian 
politics depends on other elements of society with like views. Major components of Turkey's economic 
elite as well as its major media outlets share concerns about creeping Islamization and the Kurds, not to 
mention Cyprus. Likewise, the judiciary, particularly at its senior levels, is thoroughly Kemalist-secularist, 
and did not even wait for the generals' nod to close down the Refah Partisi in 1997-1998. Some 
government prosecutors' views are even more extreme than the military's in their "militant democracy."[13]  
Finally, as a last resort, the TSK still possesses total control of the most decisive means of coercion and 
influence in Turkey, and notwithstanding periodic rumors of disaffected officers, the military can pride 
itself on airtight loyalty to command hierarchies. If the generals feel the polity is either disintegrating or 
being hijacked by mullahs—and if it senses popular support for intervention, as it did in 1980—the TSK 
will feel no compunction about moving out of the barracks and into the presidential palace. The AKP 
would perceive this as the greatest defeat. 
European Union Guarantor(?) and United States Interests 
At its base, the recent legislation is a vote for political and societal liberalization for the sake of EU 
accession. The current government has set the latter as a policy priority, while the EU has clearly 
indicated that democratization is a prerequisite of membership. As such, the promise of EU admission 
and the popularity accruing to a Turkish government effecting it may replace the military as Turkish 
secular democracy's safety net. In this scenario, whether or not the AKP desires it, the EU harmonization 
process by its very logic will dissuade the government from those practices provoking military ire. In this 
sense, even if Europe persists in throwing up obstacles to Turkish entry based on ethnic or religious 
hypocrisy, EU harmonization will have achieved changes setting Turkey on a course to liberal democracy. 
Likewise, if AKP comes up short in its EU bid and fails to deliver economic recovery—both likely—its 
electoral star might dim.  
American interests do not appear negatively affected in the near to medium term. The United States 
actually stands to benefit from its ally espousing a political system more transparent and responsive to 
the electorate, while over time it is likely that a civilian-dominated foreign policy establishment will present 
a more unified point of contact. These changes may also drive an emphasis on diplomacy over military 
ties in bilateral relations. Recent experiences in relation to Iraq commend such an approach.  
As such, U.S. foreign policy makers might play down their oft-implied preference for dealing with Turkish 
generals. Recent statements indicating disappointment that the TSK has not demonstrated more of a 
leadership role in foreign and defense policy are unhelpful in this respect: they do not increase public 
esteem for the Turkish military, while they alienate civilian diplomats from their American counterparts. 
Much more fundamentally, they convey the impression to Europeans, Turks, and other peoples in the 
Middle East of an insincere American commitment to democracy and civilian control of the military. Not 
only does this strengthen heretofore marginalized anti-American tendencies among Turks, but it may 
harm our global ability to convincingly work for democratization, human rights, and civilian control of the 
military. 
 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our Europe Resources. 
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